



THE HIDDEN COST OF M&A 
Caleb N. Griffin* 
The shareholder wealth maximization norm exerts tremen-
dous influence on both business practice and corporate legal 
scholarship. Widespread acceptance of the norm has produced 
substantial focus among corporate executives, analysts, and 
scholars on one key metric: share price. The norm and the re-
lated focus on equity prices rest on two key assumptions: (1) 
that the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization, as meas-
ured by share price, effectively maximizes the wealth of actual 
shareholders and (2) that the pursuit of shareholder wealth 
maximization, as measured by share price, is socially benefi-
cial. If the shareholder wealth maximization norm does not 
truly maximize shareholder wealth, it fails by its own terms. If 
pursuing shareholder wealth maximization does not produce a 
net social benefit but instead generates a net social harm, the 
pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization no longer consti-
tutes a “win-win” for businesses and consumers but instead el-
evates business interests in a zero-sum competition between the 
two groups.  
This Article addresses one context where the pursuit of 
share price gains both fails to maximize the wealth of all share-
holders and fails to benefit society: corporate mergers and ac-
quisitions activity. Since Henry Manne’s seminal paper, The 
Market for Corporate Control, it has been generally accepted 
that merger gains accrue either through efficiency or market 
power. Efficiency gains involve creating synergies and elimi-
nating redundancies, thus enabling merged entities to do more 
with less. To the extent that merger gains accrue via this route, 
mergers benefit everyone involved: shareholders benefit from a 
boost in share prices, society benefits from a more efficient mar-
ketplace, and consumers benefit from lower prices for goods 
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and services. In contrast, market power gains enable the 
merged entity to increase the price of the goods it sells or the 
services it provides, thereby reducing consumer welfare. Be-
cause of the increased cost to consumers, this second option pits 
the interests of some groups against others. Wealthy sharehold-
ers likely benefit more from share price increases than they are 
harmed by the increased cost of goods and services, since these 
shareholders tend to own substantial amounts of stock and to 
make substantial sums from that stock. However, the reverse 
may be true for less wealthy shareholders and society at large. 
Corporate legal scholarship has largely failed to address this 
hidden cost. 
Historically, economic literature has left unsettled whether 
merger gains accrue primarily through the former or latter 
routes, leaving scholars free to assume that merger gains do 
not necessarily come at the expense of consumers or society. Re-
cent research, however, reveals that most gains in U.S. mergers 
come from market power increases. This finding exposes two 
key shortcomings of traditionalist interpretations of the share-
holder wealth maximization norm: (1) share price gains serve 
as an inadequate proxy for increased financial welfare for all 
shareholders, and (2) share price gains serve as an inadequate 
proxy for increased social welfare. If we truly desire to maxim-
ize the wealth of all shareholders and to benefit society as a 
whole, then we cannot rely on share price gains as a proxy for 
the interests of all constituencies. 
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This Article seeks to answer two questions. First, does the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, as currently under-
stood, actually result in wealth maximization for a typical 
shareholder? Second, does pursuing shareholder wealth max-
imization benefit or harm society at large? Complete answers 
to these questions would require an analysis of all corporate 
activity. This Article instead attempts to answer these ques-
tions within a narrow scope—in the context of corporate mer-
gers and acquisitions (collectively, “M&A”).  
Empirical evidence suggests that, to the extent that M&A 
activity generates returns to shareholders, these gains accrue 
largely through socially harmful increases in market power 
rather than through socially beneficial increases in 
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efficiency.1 M&A activity that increases efficiency can create 
wealth for both consumers and shareholders: consumers ben-
efit from lower prices and the firm (i.e., the shareholders) ben-
efits from increased profits. M&A activity that increases mar-
ket power raises the price of goods and services. Although this 
price increase is profitable for the firm, consumers pay higher 
prices while receiving no corresponding increase in value for 
themselves.  
Since M&A gains accrue through market power increases 
and not efficiency increases, these gains result not from 
wealth creation, but from wealth transfers. Importantly for 
purposes of shareholder wealth maximization, these wealth 
transfers sometimes come from consumers who are also share-
holders. Shareholders of modest means spend a substantial 
portion of their income on consumer goods and services, and 
thus, for these individuals, the negative impact of increased 
consumer prices may more than offset any share price gains, 
especially if equity ownership is small or if price increases are 
significant. An examination of the source of share price gains 
in M&A ultimately reveals a story of divergent shareholder 
interests and significant harms to some classes of sharehold-
ers and to society at large. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly believed that the purpose of a corporation 
is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders.2 This 
 
1 See infra Sections IV.A–B. 
2 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who De-
cides?, 83 TEX. L. REV 1615, 1616 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & 
JESSE FRIED, THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
(2004)) (“The discretionary powers thus conferred on directors and officers, 
however, are to be directed towards a single end; namely, the maximization 
of shareholder wealth.”); David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as 
Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 (2000) (arguing that rival theories of the purpose of 
the corporation “have made only limited headway in the legal academy, 
where shareholder primacy and its narrow vision of corporate manage-
ment’s obligations continue to predominate”); Milton Friedman, A Fried-
man Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
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shareholder wealth maximization norm permeates top busi-
ness and law school curricula, where the future leaders of 
American enterprise, law, and government are routinely 
taught a shareholder wealth maximization approach to corpo-
rate purpose.3 It is manifest in the practices of corporate lead-
ers,4 who widely assert that it is their duty to maximize share-
holder wealth at the expense of other interests.5 It is pervasive 
in academic literature, where scholars frequently repeat 
statements such as “[t]here is strong support for the idea that 
shareholder wealth maximization should be the primary norm 
underlying the governance of for-profit corporations,”6 “law-
yers have commonly assumed that the managers must con-
duct the institution with single-minded devotion to 
 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 126 (“[T]here is one and only one 
social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activi-
ties designed to increase its profits.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraak-
man, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) 
(“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law 
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); DAR-
RELL WEST, THE PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION IN BUSINESS AND LAW SCHOOL 
CURRICULA 10–12 (2011) (surveying professors at leading law schools who 
describe this view of corporate purpose as “dominant,” “settled law,” 
“take[n] as a given,” and “absolutely the dominant perspective in law 
schools”). 
3 West, supra note 2, at 1–2 (finding, based upon a review of law and 
business school curricula, that such curricula often “emphasize the goal of 
maximizing shareholder value, especially in law schools”). 
4 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 417 
(2002) (“Although some claim that directors do not adhere to the share-
holder wealth maximization norm, the weight of the evidence is to the con-
trary.”). 
5 See, e.g., Jacob M. Rose, Corporate Directors and Social Responsibil-
ity: Ethics Versus Shareholder Value, 73 J. BUS. ETHICS 319, 326–27 (2007) 
(finding that when seventeen directors of Fortune 200 companies faced a 
conflict between shareholder interests and social welfare in their capacity 
as a director, all directors but one justified their decisions based upon a per-
ceived legal obligation to maximize shareholder value). 
6 Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Im-
plementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 391 (2014). 
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stockholder profit,”7 “the persistent common perception seems 
to be that directorial duties require placing shareholder 
wealth at the forefront,”8 “that shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion is not only a goal for the corporation, but in fact the only 
legitimate goal, has become the dominant normative theory of 
the corporation,”9 and “[s]hareholder wealth maximization 
long has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S. corpo-
rate decisionmakers.”10  
To be sure, this norm has not gone uncontested. In the 
early 1930s, E. Merrick Dodd argued that corporate duties le-
gally can and normatively ought to go beyond shareholder 
wealth maximization to include “a social service as well as a 
profit-making function.”11 In the 1980s and 90s, Robert Phil-
lips, R. Edward Freeman, Andrew C. Wicks and their col-
leagues formulated stakeholder theory as a challenge to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.12 Stakeholder theory 
argues that the goal of a corporation is not merely to serve 
shareholders, but also to advance the interests and well-being 
of the many stakeholders—employees, creditors, consumers, 
etc.—whose inputs prove vital to corporate success.13 In 1999, 
Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout put forth the team pro-
duction model, which provides that the corporate form exists 
not to promote shareholder interests above all others but to 
protect the “investments of all the members of the corporate 
 
7 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1163 (1932). 
8 J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Cer-
tifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 17 
(2012) (emphasis omitted). 
9 Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the 
False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 492 
(2008). 
10 Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maxi-
mization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 
1423 (1993). 
11 Dodd, supra note 7, at 1148. 
12 Robert Phillips et al., What Stakeholder Theory Is Not, 13 BUS. ETH-
ICS Q. 479, 481 (2003). 
13 Id. 
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‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file em-
ployees, and possibly . . . creditors.”14 Likewise, Lyman John-
son and David Millon recently argued for pluralism in corpo-
rate purpose, making a strong case that a corporation can be 
formed for “any lawful purpose,” not just the maximization of 
shareholder wealth.15 
Yet, despite these efforts to expand conceptions of corpo-
rate purpose, the shareholder wealth maximization norm still 
informs much of corporate decision-making. In fact, even legal 
developments that at first glance seem to best embrace alter-
native views of the corporation in practice reinforce the per-
ception that shareholder wealth maximization should reign 
supreme—at least with respect to the traditional corporation. 
For example, the emergence of blended corporations such as 
“benefit corporations,” “flexible purpose corporations,” and 
“social purpose corporations” arguably evinces a desire on the 
part of businesspeople and consumers for businesses to pur-
sue both profit and social good.16 Yet, by forming a separate 
and distinct category of corporations that aim to benefit both 
shareholders and society at large, these corporate forms in 
fact reinforce the notion that traditional corporations exist 
only to maximize the wealth of shareholders.17 
Moreover, arguments that collapse the distinction between 
shareholder wealth maximization and social welfare make it 
easier to dismiss challenges to the shareholder wealth maxi-
mization norm. These arguments essentially contend that 
when directors and managers ruthlessly pursue shareholder 
 
14 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
15 Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 31 (2014). 
16 Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and 
Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 269 (2013) (noting that the social 
enterprise movement has led to the proliferation of dual mission entities, as 
well as legal and business reform); see also Murray, supra note 8, at 3–5. 
17 Johnson, supra note 16, at 295 (noting the possibility that “legisla-
tion authorizing special vehicles for social enterprise—i.e., Benefit Corps.—
implies that traditional corporations should maintain, if not heighten, their 
predominant focus on profits and shareholder wealth”). 
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wealth maximization, they create jobs, economic growth, and 
technological advancements that ultimately maximize social 
welfare—or, in other words, that it is ultimately in the inter-
est of shareholders to promote stakeholder interests, as good 
community relations, loyal employees, and loyal customers 
are vital to the long-term health of any company.18 As Stephen 
Bainbridge states in one permutation of this argument, “For 
many years, the basic rule that shareholder interests come 
first has governed public corporations. That rule has helped 
produce an economy that is dominated by public corporations, 
which in turn has produced the highest standard of living of 
any society in the history of the world.”19 
Such arguments are appealing because they turn a conten-
tious debate into a win-win situation. Corporations have their 
shareholder wealth maximization cake and society eats it too.  
However, whether shareholder wealth maximization actu-
ally advances stakeholder welfare (and vice versa) is an em-
pirical question that proves nearly impossible to answer. 
While it is easy to contemplate hypothetical situations where 
stakeholder and shareholder interests conflict, it is far more 
difficult to empirically prove or disprove the notion that, when 
all corporations make shareholder wealth maximization their 
principal goal, society is better off than they would be if all (or 
some) corporations sought to promote both social welfare and 
shareholder interests in tandem. Such an answer would re-
quire either a nationwide experiment or an unfathomably so-
phisticated economic modeling system—both of which are out 
of academics’ grasp. 
This Article attempts to answer only a small sliver of that 
empirical question by examining whether one decision—
whether to pursue M&A—tends to benefit shareholders and 
society in tandem or instead tends to pit the interests of share-
holders and society against each other. In so doing, this Article 
seeks to assess the validity of the shareholder wealth 
 
18 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors 
and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” 
There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1172–74 (2002). 
19 Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1446. 
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maximization norm generally and shed light on how directors, 
institutional investors, proxy advisors, scholars, and policy-
makers ought to approach the shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norm in the context of M&A specifically. 
This Article begins with an analysis of the corollary as-
sumptions subsumed in the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm in Part II. Part III proceeds to analyze how these as-
sumptions have shaped theoretical understandings of M&A 
activity. Part IV proceeds to analyze the economic validity of 
these assumptions, and Part V uses economic data to promote 
a reexamination of the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm and its implications for several key corporate actors. 
II. CORE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER 
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION NORM 
A. The Purpose of a Corporation is to Benefit 
Shareholders Financially 
The most basic tenet of the shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norm is that the purpose of a corporation is to benefit its 
shareholders financially. This tenet has been expressed in 
subtly different forms. The name of the norm itself refers to 
the maximization of shareholder wealth. The case Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co., however, states this tenet in terms of stock-
holder profits: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on pri-
marily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of 
the directors are to be employed for that end. The dis-
cretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or 
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in 
order to devote them to other purposes.20  
Milton Friedman similarly focuses on the profit of stock-
holders in his famous article The Friedman Doctrine—The 
 
20 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis 
added). 
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Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.21 
The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance, meanwhile, uses both the terms corporate profit and 
shareholder gain, stating “a corporation . . . should have as its 
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to en-
hancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”22  
Though the terminology differs slightly, the core of the idea 
is that a corporation exists to benefit shareholders financially. 
This Article will use the term “shareholder financial benefit” 
to encompass the various iterations of the norm. 
B. “Shareholders” Refers to Personified Stock 
The pursuit of shareholder financial benefit, however, re-
quires corporate directors to have a sense of who shareholders 
are and what shareholders care about financially. Indeed, 
those persons that own stock—whether directly or indi-
rectly—are real, flesh-and-blood human beings, and human 
beings necessarily have a host of complex financial concerns. 
Different shareholders likely have different risk tolerance lev-
els, divergent time horizons for achieving financial goals, var-
ying levels of diversification, and heightened interests in the 
stability of the particular companies where they are em-
ployed.23 A recent college graduate may well prefer a more ag-
gressive financial approach than a retiree. An employee, even 
one who holds stock in his or her company, might care more 
about preventing layoffs than a small change in share price. 
Day-traders and long-term stock owners also likely have 
 
21 See Friedman, supra note 2. 
22 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (emphasis added). 
23 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 163, 174 (2008) (“Different shareholders have different in-
vestment time frames, different tax concerns, different attitudes toward 
firm-level risk due to different levels of diversification, different interests in 
other investments that might be affected by corporate activities, and differ-
ent views about the extent to which they are willing to sacrifice corporate 
profits to promote broader social interests . . . .”). 
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different financial preferences, as do very wealthy investors 
and working-class investors. 
Despite these complexities, the shareholder wealth maxi-
mization norm does not require directors to measure the ac-
tual financial preferences of their real-world shareholders. In-
stead, the norm as it is generally understood permits directors 
to simplify their task of benefitting shareholders financially 
by focusing on how their activities impact a “fictional share-
holder.”24 As Daniel Greenwood describes, this “fictional 
shareholder” is “a person with no interests other than its 
shareholdings in the particular corporation at issue, and no 
will other than the desire to maximize the value of that share-
holding. It is, then, no more than a personification of a share 
of the particular corporation.”25 Thus, in practice, the notion 
of “shareholder financial benefit” means financial benefit to 
the fictionalized, non-diversified holders of shares in one par-
ticular company, or, more simply, the pursuit of the best pos-
sible stock performance for the shares of a given firm. 
 
24 Gregory Scott Crespi, Maximizing the Wealth of Fictional Sharehold-
ers: Which Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, 32 J. CORP. L. 381, 383–84 
(2007) (stating that the law “allows directors to greatly reduce the burden 
of discharging their fiduciary duties to this diverse group of shareholders by 
permitting them to consider only the impacts of their actions upon a generic 
‘fictional shareholder’ abstraction”); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Hu-
man Corporation: Some Thoughts on Hume, Smith, and Buffett, 19 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 341, 358 (1997) (referring to “the current fictionalized model of the 
stockholder” as a person “with the single goal of maximizing profits”); Dan-
iel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Man-
agers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (1996) (describing 
the notion of a shareholder as “a fictional person whose sole interest is the 
shares it owns”). 
25 Id. at 1058; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 124 (1991) (describing 
“[m]arket [v]alue as a [b]enchmark under the [f]iduciary [p]rinciple”); Rich-
ard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor 
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 434 (1998) (“[I]t 
is the undiversified stockholder—an investor who is focused on the fortunes 
of a single company—who is the traditional model for the hypothetical rea-
sonable stockholder to whom management duty is owed.”). 
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This is not to say that the conflation of shareholder inter-
ests with stock performance has gone unquestioned—the no-
tion that stockholders are not a homogeneous group of indi-
viduals fixated on wealth maximization has gained increasing 
attention. Commentators have pointed to the potential for 
substantial deviation in shareholder financial interests, such 
as the aforementioned variations in risk tolerance,26 time 
horizon,27 diversification,28 and their employment situation.29 
In so doing, they have problematized the traditionalist inter-
pretation of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and, 
 
26 See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate 
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1591 (1993) (“Shareholders have differ-
ent time and risk preferences that managers must somehow factor together, 
if they are to represent fairly the artificially unified interest of ‘the share-
holders’ in general.”); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles 
in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 287 (1990) (“Each share-
holder has unique risk preferences . . . .”); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism 
About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 586 (2006) 
(comparing the risk tolerance of inside and outside shareholders). 
27 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of 
Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21 (2002) (noting that shareholders have di-
vergent time horizons); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves 
Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our 
Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1884–85 (2017) 
(noting that human investors have a longer time horizon for their invest-
ments); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact 
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 573 
(2016) (remarking that the typical hedge fund investor has a shorter time 
horizon than other groups of investors); Orts, supra note 26, at 1591 (re-
marking on divergent time preferences as an obstacle for corporate manag-
ers who seek to pursue shareholder interests uniformly). 
28 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 23, at 174 (noting that different share-
holders have different interests due in part to variances in their level of 
diversification); JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FI-
DUCIARY CAPITALISM 21 (2000) (noting the unique interests of highly diver-
sified “universal owner[s]”); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9, at 493 (“[S]hare-
holders with a diversified portfolio have different interests than 
shareholders with most of their wealth tied up in one company.”). 
29 See, e.g., Strine, supra note 27, at 1876–77 (noting that jobs, not stock 
performance, drive wealth creation for all but the very rich); Anabtawi, su-
pra note 26, at 586 (comparing the interests of employee-stockholders and 
non-employee-stockholders). 
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in particular, the presumed focus on stock performance as a 
proxy for true financial benefit. 
Despite this attention to the variation in stockholders’ 
characteristics,30 corporate law theorists have stressed the ab-
straction of a homogenous shareholder personified by the 
shares themselves as a necessary assumption of the model, as 
it enables directors to make coherent decisions and prevents 
them from using potential discrepancies in shareholder inter-
ests to justify acts actually taken in pursuit of personal gain.31 
Scholars have further argued that stock performance is the 
ideal metric because “it is the only judgment that cannot be 
manipulated, at least not for long,” implying that other sub-
stitutes for stock performance are thereby inferior.32  
Commentators have also argued that potential deviations 
in shareholder financial preferences are inconsequential. For 
instance, scholars have dismissed concerns related to share-
holders’ different time horizons by theorizing that share price 
reflects the present value of projected future prices and that, 
thus, there is no true conflict between shareholders interested 
in short-term stock performance and those interested in long-
term stock performance.33 Likewise, scholars have dismissed 
concerns related to shareholders’ various risk preferences by 
postulating that so long as a corporation seeks to maximize 
stock performance in its pursuit of risk, risk-tolerant stock-
holders will benefit from risky endeavors that match their 
 
30 Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the 
Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 464 (2005) (noting that models by 
Lucian Bebchuck, Oliver Hart, Ronald Gilson, and Alan Schwartz “make 
unrealistic assumptions about the homogeneity of shareholders, both in the 
size of their holdings and in their voting behavior. [The models] also ignore 
differences in the signal to which the shareholders listen.”). 
31 Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1445. 
32 ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINNOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 67 
(3d ed. 2004). 
33 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and 
the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 241 (2002); see also 
George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1109–11 (2008) (denying that a problem with 
short-termism exists). 
GRIFFIN_FINAL  
No. 1:70] THE HIDDEN COST OF M&A 83 
 
own risk preferences, and risk-averse stockholders can sell 
their stocks at an increased price to avoid the risk.34 Scholars 
have alternatively dismissed these concerns by arguing that 
differences in risk preferences can be ignored because risk-
averse investors have better (and cheaper) methods to miti-
gate risk, such as diversification and investment in low-risk 
instruments, than relying on corporate boards to mitigate risk 
for them.35 Finally, scholars have dismissed concerns related 
to the special interests of employee-stockholders by maintain-
ing that widespread adherence to the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm will yield better salaries, opportunities, 
and working conditions for all employees.36 Such a rebuttal 
implies that even employee-stockholders are better with the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm than without it.37 
Moreover, while it is easy to hypothesize about potential 
conflicts between subgroups of shareholders or to point to an-
ecdotal examples of such conflicts, it is more difficult to estab-
lish empirically that such conflicts exist, which facilitates the 
dismissal of such concerns. These concerns become a question 
of proof, and it is difficult to prove that, for instance, risk-
averse shareholders would be better off financially if directors 
incorporated their risk preferences into corporate decision-
making, or that shareholders who prefer short-term gains 
would benefit financially if directors incorporated that prefer-
ence into their business strategies. Because answering these 
questions requires reliance on counterfactuals, it is hard to 
find convincing evidence that shareholders with divergent in-
terests do not uniformly benefit from director adherence to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm as measured by stock 
performance. Ultimately, despite numerous critiques, reliance 
 
34 Hu, supra note 26, at 289–90. 
35 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 29. 
36 Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and In-
dustrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001). 
37 Id. 
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on stock performance as a measure of a shareholder’s financial 
well-being remains commonplace.38 
C. Shareholder Wealth Maximization Benefits Society 
as a Whole 
A third component of the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm is the assumption that adherence to the norm simulta-
neously benefits the corporation’s shareholders, the corpora-
tion’s stakeholders, and, more generally, society as a whole. 
In its simplest form, this argument provides that if an enter-
prise’s business operations prosper, then so too will the rest of 
society, which stands to gain from a “stronger corporate econ-
omy and brighter economic future.”39 A second variation of 
this argument asserts that an exclusive focus on profit maxi-
mization prevents directors from using societal welfare as a 
way to disguise acts taken primarily out of self-interest.40 And 
a third variation of this argument stresses that profit maxi-
mization provides society at large with a mechanism for iden-
tifying and pursuing the most beneficial result when making 
tradeoff decisions.41 Regardless of the exact contours of this 
argument, the core of the idea remains the same: the profit 
maximization norm provides the optimal results for share-
holders, stakeholders, and society.  
This assumption entails a less obvious corollary: corporate 
law scholars use profit maximization as a vehicle to norma-
tively assess the legitimacy or desirability of various corporate 
 
38 MICHAEL USEEM, EXECUTIVE DEFENSE: SHAREHOLDER POWER AND 
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 8–11 (1993). 
39 Charles M. Elson & Nicholas J. Goossen, E. Merrick Dodd and the 
Rise and Fall of Corporate Stakeholder Theory, 72 BUS. LAW. 735, 754 
(2017); see also Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of 
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 187, 227–28 (1991). 
40 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1445; Bernard S. Black, 
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 811, 821 (1992). 
41 Jensen, supra note 33, at 241. 
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law policies.42 These scholars justify or militate against a 
given policy because of its effect on shareholder value.43 In so 
doing, they imply that policymakers and directors share the 
same goal—maximizing shareholder value—rather than es-
tablishing whether and to what extent maximizing share-
holder value promotes commonly-held goals such as advanc-
ing social welfare. This conflation of goals is justifiable only 
when presuming that shareholder wealth maximization 
serves as a sufficient proxy for social welfare. 
III. THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
NORM AND M&A ACTIVITY: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The aforementioned components of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm—and, in particular, the twin assumptions 
that (1) the purpose of a corporation is to benefit shareholders 
financially and (2) financial benefit is measured through stock 
performance—have shaped the lens through which corporate 
law scholars view M&A activity. Indeed, pursuant to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, activities that enrich 
shareholders are deemed proper. Thus, the norm requires that 
if M&A activity increases shareholder wealth, then such ac-
tivity necessarily ought to be pursued. 
The focus on shareholder wealth as the proper measure of 
the desirability of M&A activity can be seen throughout the 
 
42 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 
YALE J. ON REG. 139, 146 (2003). 
43 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Cor-
porate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 989 (2002) (focusing on the impact 
of board veto on various shareholder returns); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., 
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, 
and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 939 (2002) (noting the effect of classified 
boards on shareholder returns); Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, 
Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern 
Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 7–8 (1995) (discussing studies 
that assess the wealth effects of antitakeover provisions); see also infra 
notes 47, 49. 
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literature on the topic.44 In the context of negotiated merger 
deals, scholars have argued that deal protection devices, such 
as voting agreements, lockups, and defensive tactics, are de-
sirable because they benefit shareholders through increased 
returns and that these same devices are detrimental because 
they harm shareholders by reducing returns.45 In the context 
of hostile takeovers, scholars have vigorously debated the 
value of takeover defenses by assessing whether these devices 
benefit or harm shareholders, using various measures of 
shareholder wealth as their criterion.46 Numerous others 
have argued that various types of M&A are beneficial or 
 
44 Robert T. Miller, Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Con-
trol: Highest Bidders, Highest-Value Users, and Socially Optimal Owners, 
39 J. CORP. L. 71, 73–74 (2013). 
45 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role 
of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1161, 1164 (1981) (arguing that shareholders’ welfare is maximized where 
the sum of “the price that will prevail in the market if there is no successful 
offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will be none) and the price that 
will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the likelihood that some 
offer will succeed)” is also maximized); Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subra-
manian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1018 
(2017) (arguing that “allocational efficiency . . . requires a balance” in order 
to best promote shareholder returns); Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: 
Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 682, 713 (1990) (noting that target shareholders may gain 
financially through stock lockups); Thanos Panagopoulos, Thinking Inside 
the Box: Analyzing Judicial Scrutiny of Deal Protection Devices in Delaware, 
3 BERKLEY BUS. L.J. 437, 439–40 (2006) (assessing whether deal protection 
devices create value for the buyers and sellers in a transaction); Matthew 
T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Case for 
Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 871, 881 (2007) (“[T]he corporation’s organizing principle should 
be the maximization of the residual returns payable to shareholders.”). 
46 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 43, at 989 (focusing on the impact of 
board veto on shareholder returns); Bebchuk et al., supra note 43, at 939 
(noting the effect of classified boards on shareholder returns); Comment & 
Schwert, supra note 43, at 23–24 (collecting studies that assess the effects 
of antitakeover provisions). 
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harmful by appealing to their effect on wealth for the share-
holders of the target and/or the acquirer.47 
Of course, the desirability of M&A activity is not a settled 
matter and remains a considerable source of debate. In recent 
years, much of this debate has focused on whether sharehold-
ers or directors should serve as the decision makers charged 
with determining whether a given merger will enrich share-
holders.48 This debate thus serves as a platform for the spar-
ring director primacy advocates and shareholder primacy ad-
vocates to make their cases. On one side of the debate, 
shareholder primacy scholars argue that empowering share-
holders to make decisions regarding takeovers promotes im-
proved corporate governance. Ex-ante, shareholder empower-
ment is thought to motivate directors to improve performance 
for fear of a corrective response by shareholders in the event 
 
47 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, 
Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 1733, 1737–39 
(1981) (assessing the financial impact of defensive tactics); Frank H. Easter-
brook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (1984) (looking at returns following success-
ful and defeated tender offers); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: 
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 604 
n.282 (2003) (citing data on shareholder returns to demonstrate that share-
holders benefit financially from M&A activity); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The 
Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 49, 51–53 (1988) (summarizing empirical data on returns to 
bidders and targets); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market 
for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 47 (1983) 
(finding that corporate takeovers generate positive gains that benefit target 
shareholders and do not harm bidding shareholders); Michael Bradley, In-
terfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. BUS. 345, 
347 (1980) (“[T]he underlying synergy [from tender offer deals] is presumed 
to have a value-increasing effect on the shares of both firms.”); MARK L. SI-
ROWER, THE SYNERGY TRAP: HOW COMPANIES LOSE THE ACQUISITION GAME 
(1997) (analyzing empirical evidence and finding that bidders earn little or 
slightly negative average returns on acquisitions). 
48 Luca Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with 
an Application to the European Union), 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 85, 86–87 
(2014); see also William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Medi-
tation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1071, 
1074–77 (2002). 
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of poor performance.49 Ex-post, shareholder empowerment ar-
guably improves corporate performance by providing a mech-
anism to replace underperforming directors with superior di-
rectors.50 On the other side of the debate, director primacy 
scholars contend that directors have better information than 
shareholders as to whether or not a given merger will promote 
shareholder value51 and that directors will promote the long-
term interest of shareholders better than shareholders them-
selves, who may myopically focus on short-term gains to the 
detriment of long-term growth and investment.52 
Note, however, that the nexus of this shareholder-director 
primacy debate centers on who should decide whether a given 
merger promotes shareholder value,53 and not whether M&A 
activity that results in increased shareholder wealth should 
be pursued, which is a generally accepted premise on both 
sides of the debate.54 Indeed, those who advocate for share-
holders as merger decision makers, such as Professors Lucian 
Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian, fre-
quently use evidence of positive shareholder returns to justify 
shareholder empowerment and evidence of negative share-
holder returns to criticize pro-board provisions.55 Even those 
 
49 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 162–71. 
50 Luca Enriques et al., supra note 48, at 86. 
51 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy in Cor-
porate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 799–800 
(2002) (noting that the board of directors has superior access to information 
than other constituencies). 
52 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance 
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1987) (noting that institutional in-
vestors’ short-termism resulted in a detrimental surge of takeovers that 
harm shareholders themselves and the larger economy). 
53 Bainbridge, supra note 47, at 605. 
54 See, e.g., id. at 550 (“[T]he director primacy theory embraces the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm. . . .”). 
55 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 853 (2005) (citing evidence that a staggered 
board “considerably reduces the returns to the target’s shareholders both in 
the short-run and in the long-run”); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in 
Corporate Governance?, 39 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Dis-
cussion Paper No. 491, 2004) (finding that “entrenching provisions” 
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who believe that directors are the proper decision makers seek 
to legitimize the board’s role in merger decision-making by cit-
ing both directors’ willingness to pursue mergers that gener-
ate gains for stockholders and the beneficial effects of pro-
board provisions on stockholder returns.56 On both sides of the 
debate, then, scholars are united in the belief that, whoever 
the appropriate decision maker may be, that decision maker 
ought to pursue M&A that increases shareholder wealth. 
To be sure, some scholars have argued that a proper anal-
ysis of M&A activity should extend beyond a narrow focus on 
shareholder wealth. One common criticism is that M&A activ-
ity imposes substantial costs on managers, creditors, employ-
ees, customers, suppliers, and local communities and that 
these costs should be factored into assessments of merger de-
sirability.57 A related criticism argues that directors should 
consider stakeholder interests when deciding whether to pur-
sue mergers.58 Such arguments beg the question of whether 
 
correlated negatively with stock returns from 1990–2003); Bebchuk et al., 
supra note 43, at 891 (arguing that staggered boards reduce shareholder 
returns). 
56 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in 
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 820 (2006); Martin Lipton & 
Paul K. Rowe, Response, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor 
Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 21 (2002) (citing evidence that pills increase 
shareholder returns). 
57 Strine, supra note 27, at 1945–47; see also Alexander C. Gavis, A 
Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors’ Responsibilities Under State 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1451, 1453 (1990). 
58 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 14, at 304–05 (applying the me-
diating hierarchy model to director decision-making); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stake-
holders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435 (1988) (arguing for the consid-
eration of stakeholder interests when evaluating takeovers); PETER O. STEI-
NER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES 47–74 (1975) (indicating that 
synergy gains can come from the cost reductions involved in combining two 
businesses); Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: 
Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 88 (1995) (noting that collusive mergers can harm stakeholder 
groups). 
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shareholder wealth maximization in the context of M&A deals 
comes at the cost of broader societal welfare. 
Proponents of the shareholder wealth maximization norm 
are not indifferent to the source of financial gains to share-
holders, and many justifications exist for how shareholder 
gains from M&A activity translate to increased societal wel-
fare. Merger gains are often attributed to the efficiency gains 
that come from displacing inefficient incumbent managers59 
or to the synergistic gains from eliminating redundancies.60 
Merger gains have also been explained by the “integration of 
production [and] more effective use of information,” both of 
which have a beneficial effect on society overall. 61 These jus-
tifications, coupled with arguments that M&A activity pro-
vides net benefits to both shareholders and society, have led 
scholars to conclude that negative externalities arising from 
M&A activity do not render those M&A activities undesirable. 
62 
 
59 See e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 1184 (“Society ben-
efits from an active takeover market, therefore, because it simultaneously 
provides an incentive to all corporate managers to operate efficiently and a 
mechanism for displacing inefficient managers.”); Ronald J. Gilson, A Struc-
tural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Ten-
der Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 838–39 (1981) (noting that replacing inef-
ficient management can yield gains); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1542 
(1996) (stating that the replacement of inefficient management through 
M&A activity “can increase the value of a company by moving its assets to 
a more efficient management team”). 
60 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Con-
stituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 1009 (1992) (citing “synergistic 
gains” as a “fairly standard explanation” for takeover gains); Michael C. 
Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 327 (1986) (noting that efficiency gains stemmed 
from certain takeovers in the oil industry); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 47, 
at 9 (“[T]akeover gains apparently come from the realization of increased 
efficiencies or synergies, but the evidence is not sufficient to identify their 
exact sources”). 
61 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs 
in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982). 
62 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and 
Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1696 
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Since Henry G. Manne’s seminal paper in 1965, Mergers 
and the Market for Corporate Control, it has been commonly 
accepted that the ways in which mergers might increase the 
value of the merging parties fall into one of two categories. 
The first involves efficiencies promoted by the market for cor-
porate control, in which mergers provide an important route 
for resources to flow to their highest-valued use.63 The second 
involves diminished competition,64 which would increase the 
market power of the merged entity and enable the merged en-
tity to raise its prices, thereby enriching its shareholders.65  
To the extent that merger gains accrue through the first 
route, social welfare and shareholder wealth maximization 
are not at odds, but are, in fact, complementary. Synergistic 
efficiencies benefit consumers by improving the production 
and distribution of goods and services, while a vigorous mar-
ket for corporate control is thought to motivate managers to 
engage in more efficient practices or to yield a change in man-
agement when firms are being run suboptimally.66 This first 
route benefits society in numerous ways, including the “less-
ening of wasteful bankruptcy proceedings, more efficient man-
agement of corporations, the protection afforded non-control-
ling corporate investors, increased mobility of capital, and 
generally a more efficient allocation of resources.”67 
 To the extent that merger gains accrue through the second 
route, however, increased shareholder wealth comes at the ex-
pense of social welfare. Market power influences the degree to 
 
(1985) (implying that an efficient takeover market ultimately fosters social 
welfare by promoting the efficient allocation of corporate assets); Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 1174 (arguing that “takeovers are bene-
ficial to both shareholders and society”). 
63 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 
J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). 
64 Id. at 120. 
65 Fred S. McChesney, Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 245, 248 (1999). 
66 Peter C. Carstensen, The Philadelphia National Bank Presumption: 
Merger Analysis in an Unpredictable World, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 252 
(2015). 
67 Manne, supra note 63, at 119. 
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which firms can increase markups on their products.68 This 
can be profitable for the firm, but it also imposes costs on con-
sumers.69 In fact, gains in market power can work as a pow-
erful mechanism for transferring wealth from the poor and 
working class to equity investors and other wealthy citizens 
by turning “the disposable income of the many into capital 
gains, dividends, and executive compensation for the few.”70 
Moreover, increased market power can also harm workers, 
since the firm faces less pressure from competitors to raise 
wages or provide better working conditions for its employ-
ees.71 In this way, increased market power may yield employ-
ment and wage levels below the socially optimal level.72  
Problematically, increased market power is not likely to be 
a temporary result from M&A activity, as firms benefitting 
from market power tend to invest in preserving their market 
position by increasing barriers to entry in the market and by 
opposing efforts to increase competition.73 In this way, in-
creased market power functions as a long-term harm involv-
ing a sustained period of higher prices and decreased compe-
tition in a given industry. 
Judges, academics, and practitioners often share a general 
belief that a merger is a desirable event, likely to benefit 
 
68 Guy Rolnik & Asher Schechter, Do Mergers Benefit or Harm the 
Economy? Q&A with Bruce Blonigen, PROMARKET (Dec. 23, 2016), 
https://promarket.org/do-mergers-harm-economy-qa-with-bruce-blonigen 
[perma.cc/C3V5-4EFY]. 
69 A. Douglas Melamed, Response, Antitrust Law Is Not That Compli-
cated, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 163, 166–67 (2017) (“[M]arket power is costly. It 
generally means higher prices and reduced output and often means dimin-
ished incentive to engage aggressively in welfare-enhancing conduct.”). 
70 Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The 
Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
235, 236 (2017). 
71 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICA-




73 Carstensen, supra note 66, at 251. 
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shareholders via efficiency gains and unlikely to result in 
harmful increases in market power.74 This presumption re-
sults at least in part from the scholarship of Robert Bork. In 
his book The Antitrust Paradox, Bork argued that the typical 
horizontal merger would not harm consumers.75 His essential 
premise was that mergers that allow at least three large enti-
ties to remain in an industry would be unlikely to result in 
any harm to competition.76 His theories, along with Chicago 
School precepts corroborating that mergers typically have be-
nign or beneficial effects on competition, have shaped philo-
sophical and practical approaches to mergers in recent 
years.77 However, such arguments are increasingly subject to 
challenge on empirical grounds.78  
Of course, to those who embrace the twin assumptions that 
(1) the purpose of the corporation is to benefit shareholders 
financially, and (2) benefit to shareholders is measured 
through stock performance, the source of increased share-
holder gains may be inconsequential. Indeed, the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm obligates corporate managers to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth, even when those gains come 
at the expense of other stakeholders and society as a whole.79 
A broader understanding of shareholder benefits changes 
the analysis. Shareholders are not merely fictional beings 
with a financial interest in the performance of a single com-
pany, but flesh-and-blood-humans. These “human investors,” 
to use Chief Justice Leo Strine’s term, care not only about the 
performance of a single stock, but likely have a substantial, 
and more acute, financial interest in the performance of their 
 
74 Id. at 252. 
75 Orley Ashenfelter et al., Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive 
Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J. L. & ECON. 
S67, S95–96 (2014). 
76 Id. at S96. 
77 Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 70, at 270–71. 
78 Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Made (Too) Simple, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 917, 921–26 (2014). 
79 Joel Slawotsky, The Virtues of Shareholder Value Driven Activism: 
Avoiding Governance Pitfalls, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 521, 521 (2016). 
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diversified retirement portfolio, the stability of their employ-
ment, the performance of the overall economy, and, relevant 
to present purposes, the prices they must pay for goods.80 To 
human investors, it matters a great deal whether the gains 
that come from M&A activity accrue at the expense of the 
American consumer and the American economy or, rather, 
whether merger gains and economic growth occur in tandem.  
For investors such as these, understanding the source of 
merger gains provides important insight into the utility of 
stock price as a measure of shareholder financial benefit. In-
deed, if the gain to share price is offset by a loss to sharehold-
ers due to price increases, the utility of the limited conception 
of shareholder wealth maximization is called into question. 
More broadly, for those who support shareholder wealth max-
imization on the grounds that adherence to the norm yields 
increased societal welfare, it also matters a great deal 
whether merger gains come at the expense of or in conjunction 
with social welfare. If merger gains accrue primarily through 
market power-induced price increases rather than efficiency 
gains, then using shareholder wealth maximization as a 
method of increasing social welfare is suspect. 
Given these considerations, it is critical to determine 
whether and to what extent M&A activity generates efficiency 
gains rather than market power increases. Such information 
can demonstrate (1) whether M&A activity benefits share-
holders beyond the mere performance of one single stock and 
(2) whether M&A activity serves society as a whole. Thus, this 
Article will now analyze whether returns from M&A activity 
result from efficiency gains or increases in market power. 
IV. A SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH ON 
THE SOURCE OF MERGER GAINS 
The source of gains from M&A activity is an important and 
controversial subject. As mentioned above, there are two main 
channels through which M&A activity may enhance 
 
80 See Strine, supra note 27, at 1945. 
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profitability: (1) increased efficiency or (2) increased market 
power.81 Traditionally, when one company acquires or merges 
with another, management highlights purported efficiency 
gains as a means to justify the merger.82 Efficiency gains, 
sometimes referred to as productivity or “synergy” gains, may 
encompass a wide variety of corporate activities, such as im-
plementing a more effective corporate strategy, eliminating 
duplicative employees, or closing underperforming plants.83 
Efficiency gains have the beneficial social effect of lowering 
prices for consumers.84 Thus, increases in efficiency mean 
that consumers will pay less for the same good or service than 
before the merger. Although efficiency gains are sometimes 
controversial—especially those that involve job losses—
 
81 Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mer-
gers on Market Power and Efficiency 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working 
Paper No. 22750, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22750.pdf 
[perma.cc/6H2L-9VBT]. 
82 See, e.g., Marriott International to Acquire Starwood Hotels & Re-
sorts Worldwide, Creating the World’s Largest Hotel Company, MARRIOTT 
NEWS CTR. (Nov. 16, 2015), http://news.marriott.com/2015/11/marriott-in-
ternational-to-acquire-starwood-hotels-resorts-worldwide-creating-the-
worlds-largest-hotel-company/ [perma.cc/SB5Z-CVBA] (noting that the 
transaction would “unlock additional value for Marriott and Starwood 
shareholders” by, among other things, “leveraging operating and G&A effi-
ciencies”); Knight Transportation and Swift Transportation Announce All 
Stock Transaction with a Combined Enterprise Value of $6 Billion, BUS. 
WIRE (Apr. 10, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.business-
wire.com/news/home/20170410005557/en/Knight-Transportation-Swift-
Transportation-Announce-Stock-Transaction [perma.cc/U43Y-G6BR] (“In-
deed, by coming together under common ownership, the companies will be 
able to capitalize on economies of scale to achieve substantial synergies.”); 
Tesla and SolarCity to Combine, TESLA (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://www.tesla.com/blog/tesla-and-solarcity-combine [perma.cc/G82D-
Z3TG] (“We expect to achieve cost synergies of $150 million in the first full 
year after closing. We also expect to save customers money by lowering 
hardware costs, reducing installation costs, improving our manufacturing 
efficiency and reducing our customer acquisition costs.”). 
83 Strine, supra note 27, at 1945. 
84 Dario Focarelli & Fabio Panetta, Are Mergers Beneficial to Consu-
mers? Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1152, 
1152 (2003). 
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economists generally believe that increases in efficiency and 
productivity, in the aggregate, have positive effects on the 
overall economy.85  
Gains from increased market power present a different sit-
uation. When two competing firms merge, the resulting firm’s 
market power may increase—that is, the firm may now face 
decreased competitive pressures. Market power influences 
“how much firms can mark up their prices above marginal 
cost.”86 As market power increases, firms can charge higher 
prices for their products. This can be profitable for the firm, 
but it imposes costs on consumers. Increases in market power 
may mean that consumers will pay more for the same good or 
service than before the merger. Because these costs to con-
sumers can be shown to exceed the extra profits to the firm—
generating what economists refer to as “deadweight loss”—the 
process reduces overall social welfare.87 Thus, when merged 
firms utilize their increased market power to increase the 
price of their products, this results in a net loss both to con-
sumers and to society overall. 
Efficiency gains and market power gains are not mutually 
exclusive; an individual merger may increase both market 
power and efficiency for the new, larger company. In order to 
determine the impact of the merger on consumers, it is neces-
sary to determine the relative magnitude of each effect. If the 
merger produces greater efficiency gains than market power 
gains, the merger will lower costs and benefit consumers.88 
However, if the market power gains outweigh the efficiency 
gains, the merger will raise costs and harm consumers.89 
 
85 See, e.g., STEPHEN PALMER & DAVID J. TORGERSON, ECONOMIC NOTES: 
DEFINITIONS OF EFFICIENCY, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 1136, 1136 (1999) (stating 
“Economists argue that the achievement of (greater) efficiency from scarce 
resources should be a major criterion for priority setting”). 
86 Rolnik & Schechter, supra note 68. 
87 Lars-Hendrik Röller et al., Efficiency Gains from Mergers, in EURO-
PEAN MERGER CONTROL: DO WE NEED AN EFFICIENCY DEFENCE? 98 (Fa-
bienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, eds., 2006). 
88 Focarelli & Panetta, supra note 84, at 1152. 
89 Id. 
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Aggregating the effects of many individual mergers and acqui-
sitions provides insight to the overall social and economic im-
pact of M&A activity. 
A. Identifying the Source of Merger Gains: The 
Problem with Case Study Data 
Many scholars have examined the source of gains produced 
by M&A activity in the economics literature. However, such 
studies have historically had a number of important limita-
tions. Because of difficulty acquiring the necessary data, 
scholars have typically taken a case study approach, examin-
ing at most a few mergers within the same or comparable in-
dustries.90 Due to the nature of this approach, such studies 
are often very limited in scope.91 Case studies tend to be less 
representative of M&A transactions generally due to selection 
bias or the tendency to disproportionately study the most 
prominent and newsworthy mergers.92 Although some studies 
have gone beyond the case study approach, they are generally 
confined to only one out of a small handful of industries—for 
instance, airlines, banking, hospitals, and petroleum.93 
These studies produce mixed results, some suggesting that 
efficiency gains outweigh market power gains and some sug-
gesting the opposite. Results appear to vary considerably ac-
cording to market composition, industry, and geographic loca-
tion, a fact that further calls into question the utility of the 
case study approach. 94 One review of the literature suggested 
 
90 Ashenfelter et al., supra note 75, at S77. 
91 See, e.g., Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., Efficiencies Brewed: Pricing and 
Consolidation in the US Beer Industry, 46 RAND J. ECON. 328 (2015) (ex-
amining the merger between Miller and Coors); Denis A. Breen, The Union 
Pacific/Southern Pacific Rail Merger: A Retrospective on Merger Benefits, 3 
REV. NETWORK ECON. 283 (2004) (examining a large railroad merger). 
92 Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 81, at 5. 
93 Ashenfelter et al., supra note 75, at S77. 
94 Further complicating the issue, scholars have posited detrimental 
market power effects from bank mergers, such as reductions in cost effi-
ciency, that are even more damaging than price increases and that are in-
frequently measured in traditional studies. See Allen N. Berger & Timothy 
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that efficiency gains predominated in North American and 
European bank mergers.95 In contrast, a study of Asian bank 
mergers found no observable efficiency effects.96 Studies of 
railroad industry mergers are also mixed, but may show evi-
dence of net efficiency gains.97 In the electric power industry, 
evidence suggests there are no net efficiency gains from 
M&A.98 Economists John Kwoka and Michael Pollitt summa-
rize the ongoing controversy as follows: 
Despite their importance, the effects of mergers re-
main in dispute. Advocates allude to the ‘market for 
corporate control,’ which views mergers and acquisi-
tions as methods for efficiency-enhancing transfers of 
underperforming assets to firms that can utilize those 
assets better and thereby realize the value gain. Skep-
tics note that while many mergers may be benign or 
beneficial, others are motivated by market power, hu-
bris, or simple mistakes, all of which result in societal 
 
H. Hannan, The Efficiency Cost of Market Power in the Banking Industry: A 
Test of the “Quiet Life” and Related Hypotheses, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 454, 
455 (1998). 
95 Robert DeYoung et al., Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial Insti-
tutions: A Review of the Post-2000 Literature, 36 J. FIN. SERV. REV. 87 (2009). 
96 Sue-Fung Wang et al., The Long-Run Performance of Asian Commer-
cial Bank Mergers and Acquisition, 5 MOD. ECON. 341, 341 (2014) (“We find 
the Asian acquiring banks experience negative long-term abnormal returns 
and are not efficiency improving . . . . In general, the long-run stock perfor-
mance and operating performance of Asian commercial bank merger[s] . . . 
cannot create synergy in the long run.”). 
97 See, e.g., Breen, supra note 91, at 25 (finding dominant efficiency 
gains in one large railroad merger); John D. Bitzan & Wesley W. Wilson, 
Industry Costs and Consolidation: Efficiency Gains and Mergers in the U.S. 
Railroad Industry, 30 REV. INDUS. ORG. 81 (2007) (finding efficiency gains 
in railroad mergers generally); Clifford Winston et al., Long-Run Effects of 
Mergers: The Case of U.S. Western Railroads, 54 J.L. & ECON. 275 (2011) 
(finding negligible effects on consumer welfare). But see Huey-Lian Sun & 
Alex P. Tang, The Sources of Railroad Merger Gains: Evidence from Stock 
Price Reaction and Operating Performance, 39 TRANSP. J. 14, 25 (2000) (find-
ing that market power effects predominate). 
98 See John Kwoka & Michael Pollitt, Do Mergers Improve Efficiency? 
Evidence from Restructuring the US Electric Power Sector, 28 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 645, 646 (2010). 
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costs. Evidence exists supporting each view. Stock 
market event studies routinely find shareholder gains 
from mergers, at least in the short term, seemingly 
corroborating the efficient-merger hypothesis. Studies 
of actual operating effects, on the other hand, more of-
ten tend to show that gains from merger are the ex-
ception rather than the rule.99  
Although industry-specific and case study evidence on 
whether these gains come from improvements in actual oper-
ating efficiency is somewhat mixed, the evidence that mergers 
regularly produce efficiency gains is weak at best. In fact, one 
“study of studies” surveyed data from previous case studies in 
order to provide a broader view of M&A activity and its effects 
on the market. Economists Ashenfelter, Hosken, and Wein-
berg reviewed forty-nine studies and found that nearly three-
quarters of them showed mergers resulting in price in-
creases.100  
Overall, while case studies can contribute to understand-
ing a specific merger or industry at issue and while meta-anal-
yses of these studies can point generally towards the causes of 
merger gains, the idiosyncrasies of the specific companies and 
sectors involved limit the ability to generalize from the data. 
Without more broad-based data, it has historically been diffi-
cult to understand the systemic impact of M&A on efficiency 
and market power.  
 
B. Identifying the Source of Merger Gains: 
Conclusions from Broad-Based Data 
Recently, it appears that the evidence for pronounced mar-
ket power effects from M&A activity is increasing.101 There 
 
99 Id. 
100 Ashenfelter et al., supra note 75, at S78. 
101 One recent study finds evidence of “synergy gains” from M&A activ-
ities. However, this study defines synergy gains as “the market-value-
weighted average of acquirer and target CARs where data for the target is 
available on CRSP,” and as such does not distinguish between market power 
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have been important advances in the ability of researchers to 
analyze the sources of gains in M&A transactions, as a num-
ber of researchers have now been able to use “micro-level data 
for a broad set of firms . . . across the economy.”102 These 
broad-based studies allow researchers to overcome the limita-
tions of the case study approach and provide useful infor-
mation about the source of gains from M&A activity on the 
national level. Only a few studies have attempted to use de-
tailed plant- or firm-level data covering a broad set of U.S. 
firms to draw more representative conclusions about the av-
erage effects of M&A activity. Such studies likely provide 
more generalizable results about the average effects of M&A 
activity due to their larger sample sizes and more representa-
tive compositions.103 This Section will outline some of the 
most important examples of such recent research. 
One important study used detailed data on a large set of 
manufacturers to study efficiency gains following different 
types of asset transfers.104 In the study, economists Vojislav 
Maksimovic and Gordon Phillips measured the effects of M&A 
involving the ownership transfer of 17,720 plants.105 Although 
the authors examined multiple types of asset transfers be-
tween firms, including those that involve a transfer of only 
part of a firm’s assets, they were able to differentiate between 
partial asset sales and M&A involving entire firms.106 The au-
thors found either zero or negative efficiency effects from 
M&A activity.107 These effects were modulated by the relative 
initial productivity of the assets of the buyer and target 
 
effects and efficiency effects. See G. Alexandridis et al., Value Creation from 
M&As: New Evidence, 45 J. CORP. FIN. 632, 641 (2017). 
102 Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 81, at 6. 
103 See, e.g., id. at 2 n.3 (noting that their sample encompassed approx-
imately fifty percent of all M&A activity during the time period). 
104 Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, The Market for Corporate 
Assets: Who Engages in Mergers and Asset Sales and Are There Efficiency 
Gains?, 56 J. FIN. 2019, 2020 (2001). 
105 Id. at 2030. 
106 Id. at 2056. 
107 In contrast, the authors found that asset sales that did not consti-
tute M&A positively impacted efficiency. See id. at 2056–57. 
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firms.108 Maksimovic and Phillips found no evidence of effi-
ciency effects in M&A transactions where the buyer’s assets 
demonstrated initial productivity exceeding those of the tar-
get firm.109 They found negative efficiency effects in M&A 
transactions where the target firm’s assets demonstrated ini-
tial productivity exceeding those of the buyer.110 Overall, the 
researchers found no evidence that aggregate M&A activity 
produced any gains in efficiency in the firms studied.111 Their 
results suggest that, when examining detailed data on a broad 
sample of firms, M&A activity does not generate aggregate ef-
ficiency gains.  
Another highly ambitious study attempted to quantify the 
effects of all mergers in the world occurring over a period of 
fifteen years.112 Economist Klaus Gugler and his coauthors 
measured the effects of mergers on market power and effi-
ciency by examining detailed accounting data on firm profits 
and sales.113 Although the researchers utilized a global data 
set, roughly half of the mergers in their sample occurred in 
the United States.114 The study shows similar results between 
domestic mergers and the larger global sample group.115 The 
authors found that a majority of global mergers over the time 
period studied either increased market power, reduced effi-
ciency, or both, and could thus be categorized as “welfare re-
ducing.”116 Overall, the study found that only 29.1% of mer-
gers appear to result in efficiency gains, with approximately 
the same number actually reducing efficiency.117  
 




112 See Klaus Gugler et al., The Effects of Mergers: An International 
Comparison, 21 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 625 (2003). 
113 Id. at 625. 
114 Id. at 632. 
115 Id. at 637. 
116 Id. at 651. 
117 Id. at 649. 
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The authors also made a number of more granular find-
ings. First, they found that “the average profitable merger . . . 
appear[s] to have increased market power.”118 Next, they 
found that the remaining (unprofitable) mergers likely gener-
ate negative efficiency effects.119 Taken together, these find-
ings indicate that aggregate global M&A activity, both profit-
able and unprofitable, generates negative social and economic 
effects.  
The study also conducted an examination of the highest 
and lowest quartiles of M&A activity, measured by the differ-
ence between actual and projected profits, which yielded prob-
lematic findings.120 The data indicated that the most profita-
ble mergers tend to generate market power increases.121 As 
one might expect, the mergers in the bottom quartile appear 
to generate even more significant negative efficiency effects 
than the average unprofitable merger.122  
The study further breaks down the results by different 
types of M&A transactions.123 Profitable instances of both 
horizontal mergers and conglomerate mergers appear to gen-
erate market power gains.124 However, the results indicate 
that profitable vertical mergers are “weakly consistent” with 
the hypothesis that they generate efficiency gains, although 
the results in this area are not statistically significant.125 The 
results for unprofitable horizontal, conglomerate, and vertical 
mergers suggest that these transactions result in losses to ef-
ficiency.126 Thus, although the results for efficiency are 
broadly similar across different types of mergers, different 
types of mergers may have distinct effects on firms’ market 
power.  
 
118 Id. at 643. 
119 Id. at 644. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 645. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 644–45. 
124 Id. at 644. 
125 Id. at 646. 
126 Id. at 645. 
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Finally, the authors made an important distinction be-
tween mergers involving firms of different sizes.127 In their 
analysis, “large firms” had average sales of approximately 
$5.7 billion per year, while “small firms” had average sales of 
approximately $341 million per year, roughly 6% of the mag-
nitude of their larger counterparts.128 The authors found evi-
dence suggesting that profitable small mergers generate pos-
itive efficiency gains.129 In contrast, they found that profitable 
large mergers, as with their sample of all profitable mergers, 
appear to generate market power gains, and that increased 
size correlates with increased market power.130 The authors 
again examined the unprofitable corollaries for mergers of 
each size, finding that these mergers generate negative effi-
ciency effects.131 These results again suggest that, although 
mergers in the aggregate may have negative social and eco-
nomic effects, certain subsets of mergers can generate positive 
results. In all, this study reaffirms the notion that mergers, in 
the aggregate, are “welfare reducing.”132 
The most recent study obtained highly-detailed data for 
companies representing approximately fifty percent of all 
M&A activity in the United States.133 In the study, Bruce 
Blonigen and Justin Pierce presented data from the entire 
universe of U.S. manufacturing industries, analyzed over a 
ten-year horizon.134 The authors described the breadth of in-
dustries their data represents, noting that the data covers “a 
very broad and diverse set of industries and firms and sectors 
. . . from timber companies to high-end electronics to toys to 
printing services.”135 Using novel research techniques and de-
tailed plant-level productivity data, they were able to 
 
127 Id. at 646–47. 
128 Id. at 646 n.19. 
129 Id. at 646–47. 
130 Id. at 646, 649–50. 
131 Id. at 646–7. 
132 Id. at 651. 
133 Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 81, at 2 n.3. 
134 Id. at 7. 
135 Rolnik & Schechter, supra note 68. 
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distinguish between potential gains in efficiency and market 
power with greater specificity and over a much larger set of 
companies than was possible in most prior studies.136 Their 
research convincingly demonstrates that the average merger 
increased market power.137 Further, they found that despite 
promises of synergy and increased efficiency, one subtype of 
mergers, horizontal mergers (or mergers between competi-
tors), may actually reduce firm productivity on average.138 
They also found no statistically significant evidence for effi-
ciency or productivity gains resulting from the full sample of 
mergers they examined.139  
In order to ensure that no possible sources of efficiency 
gains were missed, the authors examined a number of diverse 
channels often touted as sources of productivity and efficiency 
gains.140 First, they tested for efficiency gains that would have 
increased productivity at the plants in their sample. They 
found no evidence of efficiency gains through this channel.141 
Despite finding no increases in average plant-level productiv-
ity, they hypothesized that firms in the wake of a merger may 
shift production from low to high-performing plants.142 This 
would leave average plant-level productivity unchanged while 
still increasing productivity at the firm level.143 However, the 
authors found no evidence of enhanced productivity through 
this channel either.144 The authors also hypothesized that 
firm-level productivity could be enhanced if firms were to close 
down underperforming plants following completion of M&A 
transactions.145 Here, too, the evidence failed to support the 
 
136 Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 81, at 2. 
137 Id. at 3. 
138 Id. at 21. 
139 Id. at 3 (“We find that M&As significantly increase markups on av-
erage, but have no statistically significant average effect on productivity.”). 
140 Id. at 4. 
141 Id. at 19. 
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hypothesis.146 Next, the authors examined another important 
potential source of efficiency gains: “realizing economies of 
scale in non-production activities,” such as combining non-
productive general and administrative activities.147 Theoreti-
cally, such efficiency gains create value by eliminating redun-
dancies and enabling the company to pass the ensuing savings 
on to its consumers. However, the authors found “no signifi-
cant M&A effects on non-production employment of the M&A 
plants and firms, ruling out efficiency effects from realizing 
scale economies in headquarter services after an M&A.”148 
Thus, their research provides strong evidence that economic 
gains from M&A activity in horizontal mergers come not from 
the commonly-cited channels for efficiency gains, but instead 
from increases in market power. 
Together, these three broad-based studies suggest an an-
swer to the prior question about the source of gains from M&A 
activity: merger gains stem from market power increases. Im-
portantly, these studies provide information only in the aggre-
gate, and individual mergers may be more or less likely to in-
duce gains from market power or efficiency.149 However, this 
data paints a useful picture of the effects of recent M&A activ-
ity and reveals that this activity tends to lead to decreased 
competition and increased market power in given industries. 
Consequently, this Article now turns to the economic effects 
of increased market power. 
 
146 Id. at 23. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 24. 
149 There is some evidence, for example, that non-horizontal mergers, 
such as vertical and conglomerate mergers, on average produce positive ef-
ficiency gains. See id. at 21. Thus, the type of merger, and other factors such 
as the existing degree of competition in the market, barriers to entry, and 
the nature of the industry, likely play an important role in determining 
whether a given merger will result in positive, neutral, or negative net effi-
ciency gains. This implies that determining the desirability of a merger is a 
situation-specific inquiry, with the type of merger as well as other factors 
likely playing a role in whether or not a given merger will promote an opti-
mal result for shareholders and/or society. 
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C. The Economic Effects of Market Power Increases 
Market power increases enable firms to raise prices in a 
given industry to the detriment of consumers. A number of 
studies suggest that such an effect is indeed occurring in a 
worrying number of industries, corroborating the evidence 
that merger gains accrue through market power increases. 
Evidence exists that M&A activity has resulted in market 
power gains and price increases150 in industries as diverse as 
healthcare,151 airlines,152 banking,153 and home appli-
ances.154 These findings indicate that M&A-induced market 
power increases have resulted in increased prices in a number 
of important sectors.  
Other recent scholarship paints a similar picture regard-
ing the substantial growth in market power due to M&A ac-
tivity and sheds light on the resulting negative social and eco-
nomic effects. A recent meta-analysis of post-merger studies 
confirms that antitrust regulators in the United States have 
routinely allowed M&A activity that increases prices. Thirty-
 
150 See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 158 (2015). 
151 See, e.g., Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Pro-
viders to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Reme-
dies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 975–76 (2012); Avik Roy, Hospital 
Monopolies: The Biggest Driver of Health Costs that Nobody Talks About, 




152 See, e.g., John Kwoka & Eugenia Shumilkina, The Price Effect of 
Eliminating Potential Competition: Evidence from an Airline Merger, 58 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 767, 780 (2010) (finding market power gains due to 
USAir/Piedmont merger). 
153 See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 75, at S82–83 (finding that 
five of seven studies of mergers in the banking industry showed price in-
creases). 
154 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger 
of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. 
POL’Y 239, 259 (2013) (finding that the merger of Maytag and Whirlpool led 
to price increases and harmed U.S. consumers). 
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four of the forty-two mergers studied (81%) resulted in “often 
substantial” price increases, while only eight showed price de-
creases.155 The meta-analysis also found negative effects to 
product and service quality post-merger as well as other neg-
ative anti-competitive effects.156 These studies illustrate that, 
post-merger, consumers must pay higher prices, settle for 
lesser goods, or both. 
Further research has shown that excessive market power 
poses a serious threat to consumers in the United States. Lina 
Khan and Sandeep Vaheesan write, “[e]vidence across a num-
ber of key industries in the United States indicates that ex-
cessive market power is a serious problem. Firms in industries 
ranging from agriculture to airlines collude, merge and ex-
clude rivals, and raise consumer prices above competitive lev-
els, while pushing prices below competitive levels for suppli-
ers.”157 
Thus, there is evidence that excessive market power harms 
consumers across a range of industries and that M&A activity 
contributes to this harm.  
Problematically, once a corporation achieves substantial 
market power, it can be difficult to undo the damage caused 
by market concentration.158 As discussed above, increased 
market concentration makes it more difficult for new compet-
itors to emerge and for rivals to expand their operations, lead-
ing to damaging effects beyond the noted price increases.159 
Historically, it was the case that “there simply is no good 
empirical evidence that any class of stakeholders is systemat-
ically harmed by takeovers.”160 However, recent evidence 
 
155 Carstensen, supra note 66, at 248. 
156 Id. at 248–49. 
157 Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 70, at 236. 
158 Carstensen, supra note 66, at 246 (“[U]ndoing [market] concentra-
tion by new entry or expansion by marginal competitors has proven of min-
imal significance despite the theoretical appeal of the contested markets 
hypothesis. As markets become concentrated, the effect is to ‘raise rivals 
costs’ of entry or expansion.”). 
159 Id. at 251. 
160 Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 1008. 
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strongly suggests that, in the aggregate, M&A activity has in-
creased prices for American consumers. It is no longer possible 
to assume away the market power effects of M&A activity and 
the resultant harms to consumers. Thus, this Article now 
turns to an analysis of the implications of the new research 
for consumers and society at large. 
D. The Implications of Market Power Increases for 
Consumers & Society 
The foregoing Sections have demonstrated that M&A, in 
the aggregate, leads to increased market power, which in turn 
yields increased prices. This finding has significant implica-
tions for consumer welfare. It also has important distribu-
tional effects. This Section will outline the detrimental effects 
of M&A on consumer welfare and economic inequality.  
The most obvious way that price increases harm consum-
ers is that they reduce the amount of goods and services con-
sumers can afford. When prices increase without a corre-
sponding increase in quality or value, consumers must pay 
more for the same goods or services. This, of course, leaves less 
to spend on other goods and services, making consumers 
worse off than before. Likewise, when the quality of goods de-
creases without a decrease in price, consumers are similarly 
worse off. 
Somewhat less obviously, price increases due to market 
power gains increase economic inequality. Imagine that Com-
pany A and Company B are competitors selling the same prod-
uct for $1.00. When consumers purchase the product from 
Company A or Company B, the respective company’s wealth 
increases by $1.00, while each consumer’s wealth decreases by 
$1.00. Now, imagine that Company A and Company B merge. 
The combined entity has greater market power and raises the 
price of the product by X amount while leaving the quality un-
changed. In this new scenario, when consumers buy the com-
bined entity’s new, pricier products, the company’s wealth is 
increased $1.00 + X, while each consumer’s wealth is reduced 
by $1.00 + X. As a result of the merger, each transaction now 
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includes an additional transfer of X amount of wealth from 
consumers to the company.  
Looking at the ownership structure of most companies, im-
portant distributional effects are evident. On average, corpo-
rate shareholders are wealthier than the median consumer, 
and, therefore, they disproportionately benefit from stock 
price increases and are disproportionately less affected by 
price increases.161 Additionally, corporate managers often 
own large amounts of stock due to the increasing use of stock 
options and restricted stock in executive compensation, mak-
ing price increases another way that wealth is transferred 
from consumers to top executives.162 It is possible that certain 
wealth transfers from consumers to shareholders can have the 
opposite effect. For example, if a group of middle-class trades-
men owned a business making yachts, wealth transfers from 
rich consumers purchasing yachts to the middle-class owners 
may act to reduce inequality.163 However, such instances are 
rare.164 Thus, in the aggregate, M&A-induced price increases 
operate to increase economic inequality. 
The aggregate impact of wealth transfers due to market 
power is quite significant. Some scholars estimate a lower 
bound for wealth transfers due to market power on the order 
of hundreds of billions of dollars per year.165 In a political en-
vironment where economic inequality is especially salient, 
these effects are likely of special relevance to policymakers 
and scholars, as well as to boards and other fiduciaries 
charged with managing our companies and stock portfolios. 
 
161 See William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the Dis-
tribution of Wealth, 89 Q.J. ECON. 177, 189 (1975) (stating that market 
power has “a major impact on the degree of [wealth] inequality” in the 
United States). 
162 John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Eco-
nomic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 274 (2004); see also 
Sharon Hannes & Avraham Tabbach, Executive Stock Options: The Effects 
of Manipulation on Risk Taking, 38 J. CORP. L. 533, 540 (2013). 
163 Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Pol-
icy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2015). 
164 Id. 
165 Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 70, at 236. 
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V. EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC DATA  
The above data on the source of gains from M&A activity 
reveals theoretical problems for the shareholder wealth max-
imization norm and its corollary assumptions. In particular, 
the fact that mergers increase share prices at the expense of 
consumers implies that wealthy stockholders have divergent 
interests from middle class, working class, and poor stock-
holders. This divergence in interests calls into question the 
utility of share price as an exclusive measurement of financial 
well-being for all shareholders. Additionally, the fact that 
mergers increase share prices at the expense of consumers 
also implies that stockholders in the aggregate have different 
interests than American society as a whole. Thus, adherence 
to the shareholder wealth maximization norm in this case 
does not result in societal betterment, but rather in social 
harm. This Part examines the traits of American sharehold-
ers, the implications of those traits in the context of the share-
holder wealth maximization norm, and key lessons for well-
meaning corporate directors and corporate law scholars. 
A. The Traits of American Shareholders 
It is very difficult to speak of the “average” American stock-
holder, because while roughly half of the population owns 
some amount of stock, a very small percentage of the popula-
tion owns a very large percentage of total stock.166 Thus, the 
average American stockholder, looking at the pool of all stock-
holders, varies greatly from the stockholder who owns the av-
erage stock, when looking at the pool of all stocks owned. In-
deed, the average American stockholder tends to be a middle 
class person with a relatively modest income, while the aver-
age American stock is held by a wealthy person with a rela-
tively large income.167 
 
166 Greenwood, supra note 24, at 1035. 
167 See Edward N. Wolff, Who Owns Stock in American Corporations?, 
158 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 372, 387–88 (2014). 
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This situation highlights that American stock ownership is 
highly correlated with economic class. The very wealthy are 
very likely to own stock and tend to own a very large amount 
of stock. For example, 94.9% of the top 1% owns stock directly 
or indirectly, and this small subset of the population owns 35% 
of all individually-owned stock.168 Members of the middle 
class are somewhat less likely to own stock and tend to own 
smaller amounts of stock. As an illustration, 44.6% of the mid-
dle quintile of Americans own stock directly or indirectly, and 
this entire quintile only owns 1.8% of all individually-owned 
stock despite constituting 20% of the overall population.169 
The poor and working class are least likely to own stock, and 
they tend to own the smallest amount of stock. Only 21.8% of 
the bottom quintile owns any stock, and this group accounts 
for only 0.4% of all individually-owned stock.170 In all, about 
half of all individually-owned stocks in America are owned by 
individuals making over $250,000 per year, while half of all 
individually-owned stocks are owned by individuals making 
less than $250,000 per year.171 
Importantly, wealthy stockholders with large portfolios 
tend to have different financial concerns than middle class or 
poor stockholders with more modest portfolios. Indeed, earn-
ings from stocks matter far more to the financial bottom line 
of the wealthy than they do for the middle class and the poor. 
Investment earnings and retirement funds provide the top 1% 
with 30% of their annual income, while these income sources 
provide only 13% of the middle quintile’s annual income and 
just 5% of the bottom quintile’s annual income.172 
 
168 This data includes direct ownership of stock shares as well as indi-
rect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) 
plans, and other retirement accounts. Id. at 387. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 388. 
172 JOSEPH ROSENBERG, TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS 
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Additionally, the rich tend to invest far more than they spend, 
since they have the discretionary income to do so.173 In con-
trast, the poor tend to spend far more than they invest, with 
the very poor spending roughly eight times as much as they 
invest.174 Relatedly, different wealth classes also have vastly 
different marginal propensities to consume—a measurement 
which reflects the relative importance of consumer goods 
prices to each income level. The top 1% spend about 5 cents 
for each additional dollar brought in, while the middle quintile 
spends 19 cents for each additional dollar, and the bottom 
quintile spends 48 cents for each additional dollar.175  
These facts reveal three different classes of Americans. 
The first class consists of a few exceedingly wealthy share-
holders, who are not very different in their financial interests 
from the fictionalized caricature of a shareholder.176 These in-
dividuals own a hefty amount of stock, earn a substantial sum 
from these stockholdings, and are more or less unaffected by 
price fluctuations in the consumer goods market.177 This 
group of Americans cares very much about stock performance, 
at least from a financial perspective, and likely benefits from 
M&A activity that yields both increased stock prices and in-
creased consumer goods prices. A second class of Americans 
consists of all other shareholders. This group of individuals 
tends to own modest amounts of stock that provide relatively 
little income. This group spends more on consumer goods and 
is far more vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of consumer 
goods.178 Thus, M&A activity that boosts share prices while 
inflating consumer goods prices likely harms this subset of 
 
173 Max Ehrenfreund, Where the Poor and Rich Really Spend their 
Money, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/14/where-the-poor-and-rich-spend-re-
ally-spend-their-money/ [perma.cc/HF88-G58A].  
174 Id. 
175 Christopher Carroll et al., The Distribution of Wealth and the Mar-
ginal Propensity to Consume, QUANTITATIVE ECON. (forthcoming June 2017). 
176 Crespi, supra note 24, at 388–89. 
177 See supra notes 167–174 and accompanying text. 
178 Id. 
GRIFFIN_FINAL  
No. 1:70] THE HIDDEN COST OF M&A 113 
 
Americans. A third class of Americans represents the inter-
ests of American society as a whole. These “average Ameri-
cans” are more likely not to own any stock than they are to 
have even a small amount of stockholdings.179 Moreover, the 
“average American” earned $74,664 before taxes and had 
$57,311 worth of annual expenditures, leaving them with very 
little discretionary income.180 This group is thus very likely to 
be harmed by price increases and unlikely to significantly ben-
efit from share price increases.181 Ultimately, only the first, 
numerically small class of Americans likely benefits from 
M&A activity, while the other two classes are likely harmed.   
B. The Implications of the Traits of American 
Shareholders for the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm 
Given that merger gains accrue, in the aggregate, through 
price increases, the assumption that shareholder financial 
benefit can be effectively measured by stock performance does 
not hold for all stockholders. It is true that, for the very 
wealthy stockholder, stock price gains likely offset any price 
increases that they must pay for goods, given that they tend 
to earn substantial sums of money from stock and spend a rel-
atively small portion of their wealth on consumer goods. For 
this subset of stockholders, then, stock performance likely 
does provide a suitable measure of their financial well-being. 
Middle class and poor shareholders, however, tend to spend 
more than they invest and to make relatively little from their 
stockholdings. For such shareholders, the excess costs that 
they must pay for goods and services likely dwarf any gains 
that may accrue to their stock portfolio, meaning that stock 
performance provides an incomplete and misleading view of 
 
179 Wolff, supra note 167, at 388. 
180 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Con-
sumer Expenditures—2016 (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/ news.re-
lease/pdf/cesan.pdf [perma.cc/Q7Z5-DRLG].  
181 Greenwood, supra note 24, at 1083. 
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the net financial effect of M&A activity on this group of share-
holders.  
Additionally, the data demonstrating that merger gains 
derive from price increases rather than synergy gains also 
complicates the assumption that adherence to the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm promotes social welfare. Indeed, 
given that merger gains primarily come at the expense of the 
consumer, improved stock performance in this context is actu-
ally at odds with overall social welfare. When a merger causes 
stocks to do better, it also causes consumers to do worse. Be-
cause very few Americans own substantial amounts of stock, 
stock market gains through M&A are not a boon to society as 
a whole. When merger gains must be paid for at the grocery 
store, pharmacy, or shopping mall, they constitute a net harm 
to the majority of Americans. 
C. Implications for Well-Meaning Directors 
Given the foregoing, what is a well-meaning corporate di-
rector to do when faced with the decision of whether or not to 
pursue a merger? A well-meaning corporate director adhering 
to the shareholder wealth maximization norm in its tradi-
tional form should pursue M&A activity that boosts share 
price, even with the knowledge that those gains come at the 
expense of both consumers and some portion of the company’s 
shareholders. Indeed, if directors are responsible for maxim-
izing shareholders’ wealth, and if that wealth is to be meas-
ured by stock performance, then M&A activity that provides 
a boost to share prices should be embraced and celebrated. 
However, if a corporate director chooses to instead embrace 
shareholder wealth maximization in a broader sense than the 
narrow focus on share price increases, then marginal M&A 
activity may become less appealing. Although most directors 
facing the prospect of a takeover are (and should be) focused 
primarily on the adequacy of the merger premium, in close 
cases, directors should consider the potential impact of M&A-
induced price increases on their shareholders. At the margins, 
this may tip the balance of directors’ decisions on whether cer-
tain mergers provide a net benefit to shareholders, or whether 
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they should negotiate for a higher premium. Moreover, de-
pending on the magnitude of the merger premium and the re-
sulting price increases to the firm’s goods and services, such a 
merger may actually constitute a net harm to a sizable portion 
of that firm’s stockholders. Thus, a director might conclude 
that, to truly maximize his or her shareholders’ welfare, firm 
resources are better spent on alternate strategies for growth, 
such as research and development, than on the pursuit of 
M&A activities.182 
Corporate constituency statutes present another wrinkle 
for the well-meaning director. Forty-four states have passed 
“other constituency” statutes that permit directors and man-
agers to consider other constituencies’ interests in their corpo-
rate decision-making processes.183 Under these statutes, di-
rectors are able to take non-shareholders’ interests into 
account.184 Although directors would be unconcerned with the 
 
182 Strine, supra note 27, at 1908. 
183 Examples of “other constituency” statutes include: CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 33-756 (2017); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8.85 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
271B.12-210 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (1996); MINN. 
STAT. § 302A.251 (2006); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1989). Only 
six states—Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, and 
Oklahoma—have not passed similar legislation. See Carol Liao, A Critical 
Canadian Perspective on the Benefit Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 683, 
687 (2017). 
184 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2017) (providing that a director 
“may consider in determining what [he or she] reasonably believes to be in 
the best interests of the corporation . . . the interests of the corporation’s 
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and . . . community and so-
cietal considerations”); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (1989) (allowing that cor-
porate directors and officers “may, in considering the best long term and 
short term interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action . . . 
upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation or its subsidi-
aries, communities in which offices or other establishments of the corpora-
tion or its subsidiaries are located, and all other pertinent factors”); IND. 
CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2009) (permitting that “[a] director may, in considering 
the best interests of a corporation, consider the effects of any action on 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, and 
communities in which offices or other facilities of the corporation are lo-
cated, and any other factors the director considers pertinent”); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (West 1999) (permitting that “a director, in determining 
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impact of their M&A activity on society as a whole under the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, corporate constitu-
ency statutes in many states allow directors to take such con-
siderations into account. Because M&A activity that increases 
prices is likely to cause financial harm to some shareholders 
and society as a whole, directors of firms incorporated in 
states with corporate constituency statutes may be especially 
obliged to consider potential price increases for their goods 
and services when determining whether to approve M&A ac-
tivity. 
D. Implications for Well-Meaning Mutual Fund 
Managers 
Of course, corporate directors are not the only agents with 
the ability to influence whether and to what extent a given 
firm pursues M&A activity. Because they often control signif-
icant portions of a corporation’s shares, institutional investors 
have the power to sway directors towards certain decisions—
including the decision to pursue more or less M&A activity.185 
Mutual funds—investment vehicles that pool money from 
many investors—are currently the biggest bloc of institutional 
investors, controlling 20.5% of all U.S. equities as of 2015.186 
Though their activism efforts have been more muted than 
those of other institutional investors, mutual funds 
 
what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, 
shall consider the interests of the corporation’s shareholders and, in his dis-
cretion, may consider . . . [t]he interests of the corporation’s employees, sup-
pliers, creditors and customers; . . . [t]he economy of the state and nation; 
. . . [c]ommunity and societal considerations; . . . [t]he long-term as well as 
short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders”); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 21-2,102 (2017) (providing that “[a] director may, but need not, in 
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider, among other 
things, the effects of any action on employees, suppliers, creditors, and cus-
tomers of the corporation and communities in which offices or other facili-
ties of the corporation are located”). 
185 See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder 
Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 958–60 (2013). 
186 See SIFMA, 2016 FACT BOOK 83 (2016), https://www.sifma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/sifma-fact-book-2016.pdf [perma.cc/6QVD-J7KY].  
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traditionally have influenced management decisions by opting 
or threatening to redirect capital to other investments, and 
they have increasingly engaged in other forms of activism in 
recent years.187  
Their power to influence corporate decision-making raises 
an important question: what is a well-meaning mutual fund 
manager to do when faced with the decisions of whether to 
vote for a merger and whether to urge management to pursue 
potential M&A activity? Research suggests that many mutual 
fund managers believe it to be their primary or even sole duty 
to maximize fund performance.188 An understanding of the 
best interests of fund shareholders as essentially indistin-
guishable from fund performance mimics traditional concep-
tualizations of the shareholder wealth maximization norm 
that stress stock performance as the proper measure of stock-
holders’ financial well-being. A mutual fund manager thusly 
focused on performance would be inclined to urge firms to-
wards M&A activity that increases share prices, even if such 
increases come at the expense of consumers. However, to truly 
maximize the wealth of fund shareholders, mutual fund man-
agers ought to consider their shareholders’ financial interests 
more broadly, as some mutual fund members might benefit 
more from a competitive marketplace and competitively-
priced goods than from improved stock performance.189 
In fact, mutual fund shareholders are even more likely 
than the typical shareholder to be disadvantaged by the mar-
ket power gains and price increases that tend to accompany 
M&A activity. While half of all shareholders make more than 
$250,000 annually, 39% of mutual fund shareholders earn less 
than $75,000 annually, and 55% earn less than $100,000 
 
187 Gelter, supra note 185, at 960. 
188 Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not 
Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1461 (2002). 
189 Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization and 
Distribution for Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1531, 1574 (2002). 
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annually.190 Due to this income differential, mutual fund own-
ers have comparatively less disposable income than tradi-
tional shareholders, making them more vulnerable to price in-
creases. Additionally, the purpose of 92% of mutual fund 
investment is saving for retirement, but 76% of mutual fund 
owners are employed and thus they have yet to achieve their 
investment goal.191 Increased costs for goods and services 
likely reduce the ability of many mutual fund members to con-
tribute additional capital to their retirement plan, thus hin-
dering their ability to pursue their stated financial goals or 
forcing them to reduce spending in other areas to compen-
sate.192 In these ways, mutual fund shareholders are espe-
cially likely to be disadvantaged by M&A activity. 
Given the characteristics of mutual fund members, mutual 
fund managers ought to be reluctant to support marginal 
M&A activity, lest they indirectly subvert the financial well-
being of their shareholders. Indeed, depending on the relative 
magnitude of the change in share price and the increased cost 
of goods and services, a merger that results in price increases 
might disserve the majority of mutual fund shareholders by 
raising prices for goods. In close cases, mutual fund managers 
considering this broadened conception of shareholder wealth 
maximization may be more likely to steer management away 
from M&A activity and towards alternate courses of action 
more likely to generate net financial benefits for the typical 
mutual fund member. 
E. Implications for Well-Meaning Pension Fund 
Managers 
Pension funds are another group with substantial influ-
ence over whether, when, and to what extent directors pursue 
 
190 Wolff, supra note 167, at 388; Kimberly Burham et al., Characteris-
tics of Mutual Fund Investors, 2015, ICI RES. PERSP., Nov. 2015, at 1, 5. 
191 INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 113 (57th ed. 
2017) (ebook). 
192 See Strine, supra note 27, at 1880 (noting that most Americans have 
relatively little surplus to contribute to retirement funds, thus suggesting 
that increased expenses would further deplete that surplus). 
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M&A activity. In essence, pension funds are retirement plans 
that pool contributions from fund members and their employ-
ers. Upon retirement, members receive either a pre-set 
amount (as in a defined benefit plan) or an amount dependent 
upon stock performance (as in a defined contribution plan).193 
In all, pension funds control roughly fourteen percent of all 
U.S. equities, and, as such, these entities hold substantial 
power over U.S. corporations through their voting power, ac-
tivism, and ability to redirect capital.194 In fact, pension funds 
are some of the “most active institutional investors in terms 
of their attempts to change the management practices of the 
companies in which they invest.”195 
To what ends should pension funds wield their considera-
ble influence in the context of corporate M&A activity? Alt-
hough pension fund managers are not the archetypal actor in 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm, these managers 
have increasingly adopted the goal of shareholder wealth 
maximization as an important end for their members.196 In 
adhering to this norm, pension fund managers would likely be 
inclined to promote M&A activity that they believe will in-
crease share prices under the assumption that doing so would 
yield financial benefits for plan members.  
However, do such activities actually benefit the typical 
pension fund member? An analysis of the characteristics of 
pension fund members sheds some light on this issue. 
The money invested via pensions represents a substantial 
portion of the retirement funds for a wide swath of American 
 
193 S. Burcu Avci et al., How Should Retirement Plans Be Organized?, 
13 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 337, 346, 348 (2017). 
194 See SIFMA, supra note 186, at 83. The 14% figure is the sum of 
three percentages in the U.S. Holdings of Equities by Type of Holder da-
taset: (1) private pension fund holdings, which were 6.6% in 2015; (2) state 
and local government retirement fund holdings, which were 6.5% in 2015; 
and (3) federal government retirement fund holdings, which were 0.6% in 
2015. 
195 David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: 
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 206 (2005). 
196 Gelter, supra note 185, at 963. 
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workers, such as school teachers, firefighters, police officers, 
office workers, and sanitation workers.197 The benefits re-
ceived from pension funds are generally relatively modest in 
size. For example, the average amount paid out to public pen-
sion fund retirees in 2010 was just under $26,000 per year, 
roughly half the median income in the U.S.198 This regular 
income nonetheless provides an important source of financial 
security to many Americans. One study found that poverty 
rates among the elderly were six times greater for those that 
lacked pension income than for those with it, and that 4.7 mil-
lion households managed to escape poverty or near-poverty 
due to their pension income.199 In all, pensions provided the 
elderly with 18% of their income as of 2013.200  
This data suggests that pension fund members tend to be 
individuals who depend upon their plans for subsistence dur-
ing retirement. These individuals likely would not benefit 
from a transfer of wealth from consumers to stockholders and 
would be more likely to be harmed by M&A activity that 
yielded market power increases and inflated prices.201 They 
would, however, benefit from a corporate governance system 
focused on sustainable wealth creation by generating jobs, 
wage growth, and efficiency gains.202 Moreover, increases in 
 
197 David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Ac-
tivism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
2031, 2034 (2010). 
198 Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’r, Keynote Address at the 
NAPPA 2012 Legal Education Conference: Pension Funds as Owners and 
Investors: A Voice for Working Families (June 27, 2012),  
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012-spch062712laahtm [perma.cc/45KB 
-H9KD]; KIRBY G. POSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME: 2015 
1–2 (2016). 
199 NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., WHY DO PENSIONS MATTER? 8 (2010) 
https://www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/final_module2_ 
why_do_pensions_matter.pdf [perma.cc/F8BA-7LUW]. 
200 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., NO. 13-11785, FAST FACTS & FIGURES ABOUT SO-
CIAL SECURITY, 2015, at 7 (2015), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chart 
books/fast_facts/2015/fast_facts15.pdf [perma.cc/LNS7-E5KN]. 
201 Greenwood, supra note 24, at 1083. 
202 Strine, supra note 27, at 1882. 
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consumer goods prices likely detract from the amount that 
pension fund members with defined contribution plans can 
contribute to their retirement, thus coming at the expense of 
their financial security in retirement. 
Those pension fund members with defined benefit plans 
are likely to be even more negatively impacted by M&A activ-
ity than other working- and middle-class individuals. Mem-
bers of traditional “defined benefit plans” receive a set benefit 
upon retirement.203 Because this benefit is “set,” individual 
pensioners will receive the same benefits upon retirement re-
gardless of the performance of the investments in the plan. 
This means that they are unable to capture any of the gains 
in the pension plan’s investments. Certainly, individual pen-
sioners hope that the pension plan remains solvent enough to 
pay out their claims upon retirement, but, beyond this thresh-
old, they are, for good or ill, significantly insulated from stock 
market returns. In the case of M&A activity, this insulation 
likely turns out to be for their ill. Pension fund members will 
directly bear the increased prices resulting from aggregate 
M&A activity in their capacity as consumers, but will only in-
directly, if at all, capture any of the gains generated by these 
mergers in their capacity as indirect shareholders. In this 
way, pension fund members with defined benefit plans are 
forced to bear the negative externalities of M&A without 
fully—and, sometimes, at all—sharing in its gains.  
In light of these facts, it appears that working- and middle-
class pension fund members, particularly those with tradi-
tional defined benefit pension plans, may be uniquely disad-
vantaged by M&A activity. Pension fund managers ought to 
look holistically at the financial concerns of plan members 
when selecting investments, voting on corporate matters, and 
engaging in activist efforts. To that end, pension fund manag-
ers should wield their considerable power to oppose marginal 
M&A activity, as the harms to pension fund recipients in their 
capacity as consumers of goods and services may exceed any 
benefits in the form of share price gains. Only by looking at 
 
203 See id. at 1879 n.20. 
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the interests of pension members in a broader sense than 
gains to share price can pension fund managers truly act in 
the financial best interests of the typical pension fund mem-
ber. 
F. Implications for Well-Meaning Hedge Fund 
Managers 
Hedge funds form a third group of institutional investors 
with considerable power over whether and to what extent cor-
porate directors pursue M&A activity. The hedge fund indus-
try’s influence comes not only from its control of over $3 tril-
lion worth of assets, but also from the tendency of hedge funds 
to be more active and involved investors relative to other fi-
nancial market actors, such as mutual and pension funds.204 
Many “activist” hedge funds aggressively push for specific 
changes at the companies in which they invest. Although ac-
tivist hedge funds represent a minority of all hedge funds, 
their numbers and activity have ballooned in recent years, 
driving them to the forefront of corporate executives’ collective 
consciousness.205  
A great deal has been written regarding the effects of 
hedge fund activism on U.S equity markets. Consistent with 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm, research on 
hedge fund activism tends to focus on its effect on stock per-
formance. Some scholars argue that activism positively 
 
204 Hedge Fund Industry Capital Surpasses Historic $3 Trillion Dollar 
Milestone, HEDGE FUND RES. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.hedge-
fundresearch.com/news/hedge-fund-industry-capital-surpasses-historic-3-
trillion-dollar-milestone [perma.cc/KQT2-TEJC]; Marcel Kahan & Edward 
Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 282 (2009) (“[H]edge funds tend to pursue active and 
aggressive investment strategies.”). 
205 See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 27, at 548 (“Hedge fund activism 
has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically.”); see also Marcel Kahan & Ed-
ward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Con-
trol, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2007). 
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influences returns to shareholders.206 Others contend that 
while the short-term returns may be positive, hedge fund ac-
tivism can be harmful to companies in ways that are only ev-
ident over longer time horizons.207 This issue, while hotly con-
tested, remains unsettled. 
Regardless of whether hedge fund activism generates 
short-term or long-term returns, it is clear that one of the pri-
mary strategies for achieving these returns involves M&A ac-
tivity. In fact, pushing the target company into M&A activity 
 
206 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1155 (2015) (noting that there is 
an “initial positive stock-price spike accompanying activist interventions” 
and that this spike reflects “correctly the intervention’s long-term conse-
quences”); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, 
and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (summarizing their 
findings that “find that the market reacts favorably to activism, consistent 
with the view that it creates value”); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepre-
neurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 
J. FIN. 187, 189 (2009) (finding a significantly positive market reaction for 
activist hedge funds’ activities). 
207 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance 
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless 
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 
12 (2010) (“[I]t is increasingly the case that the agenda setters in corporate 
policy discussions are highly leveraged hedge funds, with no long-term com-
mitment to the corporations in which they invest.”); Martin Lipton, Empir-
icism and Experience; Activism and Short-Termism; the Real World of Busi-
ness, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/28 
/empiricism-and-experience-activism-and-short-termism-the-real-world-of-
business/ [perma.cc/T6TL-Z922] (“While there is no question that almost 
every attack, or even rumor of an attack, by an activist hedge fund will re-
sult in an immediate increase in the stock market price of the target, such 
gains are not necessarily indicative of real value creation. To the contrary, 
the attacks and the efforts by companies to adopt short-term strategies to 
avoid becoming a target have had very serious adverse effects on the com-
panies, their long-term shareholders, and the American economy.”); Anab-
tawi, supra note 26, at 564 (“[T]he hedge fund is likely to favor policies by 
the firms in which it invests that produce short-term gains, even if a more 
patient investment orientation would generate higher returns over the long 
term.”). 
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is by far hedge fund activists’ most lucrative strategy.208 Suc-
cessful takeovers serve as the driving force behind activist 
hedge funds’ ability to generate long-term abnormal positive 
returns.209 Numerous scholars concur in this sentiment. Yvan 
Allaire & François Dauphin write, “[g]etting companies 
merged or sold off is a clear driver of hedge fund perfor-
mance.”210 John Coffee and Darius Palia note that the “evi-
dence suggests that changes in the expected takeover pre-
mium, more than operating improvements, account for most 
of the stock price gain, both in short-term and long-term stud-
ies.”211 Indeed, an analysis of 1740 activist interventions 
showed that the returns from a takeover of the target com-
pany were almost double those of any other strategy employed 
by activist hedge funds.212 Another study by Alon Brav, Wei 
Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas generated similar 
data, also finding that activism aimed at pushing the target 
company to sell produced better returns than any other strat-
egy.213 Further confirmation comes from Robin Greenwood 
and Michael Schor, who find that targets of hedge fund activ-
ism that are ultimately acquired generate positive abnormal 
returns but that targets which are not acquired generate ab-
normal returns of zero.214 William W. Bratton concludes, after 
conducting a review of the relevant literature, “[t]here is no 
question that activism prompts mergers.”215 
 
208 Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An Interna-
tional Study, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2933, 2935 (2017). 
209 Coffee & Palia, supra note 27, at 588. 
210 Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, The Game of ‘Activist’ Hedge 
Funds: Cui Bono?, INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE, Nov. 2015, at 25. 
211 Coffee & Palia, supra note 27, at 588. 
212 See Becht et al., supra note 208, at 2954–55. 
213 Brav et al., supra note 206, at 1759. 
214 Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeo-
vers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362, 363 (2009) (“[T]he returns associated with activ-
ism are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into 
a takeover, thereby collecting a takeover premium.”). 
215 William W. Bratton, Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Ju-
risprudence of Threat 13 (U. Pa. L. Sch. Inst. L. & Econ. Research Paper 
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The increased M&A activity prompted by mergers has sig-
nificant negative implications. As discussed at length in Part 
IV of this paper, studies indicate that, in the aggregate, M&A 
activity increases prices and produces zero, or sometimes neg-
ative, efficiency effects.216 As we have seen, hedge fund activ-
ism relies on pushing target companies into mergers to gener-
ate the bulk of activists’ returns. Thus, based on the existing 
research, it is likely that hedge fund activists’ most profitable 
strategies result in increased prices and reductions in con-
sumer surplus. This represents an important, and heretofore 
unmentioned, negative externality of hedge fund activism. 
Indeed, if merely reflective of M&A activity in general, the 
increased M&A activity due to hedge fund activism would re-
sult in the same level of increased prices and reductions to 
consumer surplus as other M&A transactions. However, be-
cause of the nature of hedge fund activism, the particular 
M&A activity generated by activist hedge funds may be even 
more damaging. By their nature, activist hedge funds tend to 
conduct their activism within large, publicly-traded compa-
nies. When a hedge fund makes use of its most lucrative strat-
egy, pushing the target company to sell, the pool of potential 
buyers for a large, publicly-traded company is largely re-
stricted to other large, publicly-traded companies.217 This is a 
perfect recipe for increases in market concentration and mar-
ket power. If restricted to large, publicly-traded companies, 
theory predicts an increase in the negative externalities of 
M&A activity. First, publicly-traded companies are likely to 
have already reached levels of production that limit efficiency 
gains from economies of scale.218 This means that these large 
 
Series, Paper No. 16-20, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2835610## [perma.cc/WF27-PKVA]. 
216 See generally Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 81. 
217 In fact, there is evidence that the companies that activists target for 
sale are substantially larger than the median company targeted by activists. 
See Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 210, at 20. 
218 Carstensen, supra note 66, at 252 (“First, as a matter of logic, it is 
unlikely that mergers among major market competitors will significantly 
affect economies of scale or scope. Empirical studies provide significant sup-
port for this conclusion.”). 
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M&A transactions may be even less likely than the average 
M&A deal to result in meaningful efficiency gains. Second, be-
cause of their large size, there is an increased probability that 
the combination of such firms will increase market power.219 
All else being equal, the combination of two large firms will 
produce an entity with greater market power than will the 
combination of two smaller firms. Because activist hedge fund 
returns largely depend on finding buyers for large, publicly-
traded firms, one would theoretically expect that their activity 
results in market power increases that are even more damag-
ing than the average M&A transaction. Empirical results con-
firm this theory, as evidence suggests that, relative to mergers 
by small firms, mergers by large firms are both less likely to 
generate efficiency gains and more likely to generate market 
power gains.220 Thus, both theory and evidence suggest that 
hedge fund activism produces M&A activity that is norma-
tively worse than the average M&A transaction from the per-
spective of both efficiency gains and market power gains. 
The fact that hedge funds promote M&A activity that 
harms consumers in the aggregate raises an important ques-
tion: how should hedge fund managers balance the need to 
generate returns for the fund against the very real negative 
effects that M&A-induced price increases have on consumers? 
To the extent that hedge funds embody their stereotype as the 
investment vehicle of the ultra-wealthy and adhere to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, hedge fund manag-
ers ought to continue to promote M&A activity even given in-
creasing awareness of resultant market power effects, since 
the wealthy likely receive a net financial benefit from such ac-
tivity.221 
 
219 Allaire & Dauphin report that larger firms (in the top quintile of 
market capitalization for companies sampled) are even more likely to be 
pushed into sale than a standard activist target. See Allaire & Dauphin, 
supra note 210, at 23. 
220 Gugler et al., supra note 112, at 646. 
221 ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS vii (2003) (remarking 
on the stereotypical representation of hedge funds as “secretive, 
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Data, however, suggests that many hedge funds indirectly 
serve investors of more modest means—pension funds mem-
bers.222 In all, pension funds provide approximately forty per-
cent of hedge funds’ capital.223 Because pension funds can 
qualify as “accredited investors,”224 they are able to funnel 
money to hedge funds from individuals who otherwise would 
be barred from hedge fund investments.225 These individuals 
are likely to be sensitive to the price increases and resulting 
negative impacts on consumer welfare caused by hedge fund 
activism mediated through M&A activity. In fact, it is likely 
that these individuals are more negatively impacted than 
other working- and middle-class individuals. As discussed 
above, those pension fund members who take part in tradi-
tional defined-benefit pension plans are insulated from stock 
market gains and are uniquely harmed by M&A-induced price 
increases. When considering that the M&A activity generated 
by hedge fund activism likely results in even greater market 
power gains than the average M&A transaction, this harm is 
magnified. Thus, hedge fund activism is likely uniquely harm-
ful to many pension fund members. In this light, hedge fund 
activism and its focus on promoting M&A activity may be dis-
advantageous for a substantial subset of hedge fund investors. 
Hedge fund managers who take a more holistic view of their 
members’ well-being should be more hesitant to promote M&A 
activity, and pension fund managers should likewise be much 
more hesitant to invest in activist hedge funds.  
 
unregulated investment vehicles that enable wealthy individuals to make 
highly leveraged speculative bets in the global financial and commodity 
markets”). 
222 See Strine, supra note 27, at 1959 (“The hedge fund industry cannot 
function at its current scale without finding investments from pension funds 
and the like . . . .”). 
223 PREQIN, 2014 PREQIN GLOBAL HEDGE FUND REPORT 10 fig.7.22 
(2014), https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/The_2014_Preqin_Global_ 
Hedge_Fund_Report_Sample_Pages.pdf [perma.cc/4MU3-WDQ3]. 
224 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016). 
225 Strine, supra note 27, at 1935. 
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G. Implications for Scholars  
In his essay The American Scholar, Ralph Waldo Emerson 
outlines the duties of a scholar: “[t]he office of the scholar is to 
cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst 
appearances.”226 It is clear that the traditional conceptualiza-
tion of the purpose of a corporation involves many appear-
ances. Stock performance appears to be an acceptable way to 
measure shareholder financial benefit. Adherence to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm appears to benefit so-
ciety as a whole. In the context of gains from M&A activity, 
these appearances do not translate into facts. Stock perfor-
mance provides an imperfect measure of shareholder financial 
benefit, and it can actually be used to hide concrete harms to 
the “human investors” who make up a sizable percentage of 
the stockholding population. Perhaps even more problemati-
cally, adherence to the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm can generate substantial harms to society as a whole, 
serving more as a transfer of wealth from poor and working 
class consumers to extremely wealthy investors than as a “ris-
ing tide” lifting all boats. Scholars thus have a duty to look 
beyond stock performance and examine alternative measures 
of financial well-being and to question the assumption that 
gains to shareholders will necessarily translate to gains for 
society as a whole. In order to provide sound advice for policy-
makers, these scholars need to look critically at corporate 
practices generally and M&A activity in particular to expose 
the areas where shareholders’ financial interests may be at 
odds with each other and with social welfare. It is only with 
this perspective that directors and policymakers can pursue 
the strategies and policies that best serve American society. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article advances two central arguments: first, share 
price gains do not always represent increases in the welfare of 
 
226 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The American Scholar, in RALPH WALDO 
EMERSON ESSAYS & LECTURES 51, 63 (Joel Porte ed., 1983). 
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individual shareholders; and second, share price gains do not 
always represent increases in societal welfare. In advancing 
these arguments, this Article presents a challenge to the tra-
ditional conception of the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm. This conception has allowed boards of directors and 
other corporate actors to serve fictionalized versions of their 
real shareholders. It has also allowed corporate actors to ig-
nore the true impact of their actions on the very individuals 
in whose best interests they purport to act.  
This Article uses M&A activity as a lens through which to 
examine some of the central claims of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. This examination reveals that the tradi-
tionalist conception of shareholder wealth maximization is 
limited and problematic in a number of ways. Although M&A 
activity may increase share prices, the evidence suggests that 
it also produces undesirable social and economic effects. De-
spite the fact that these results emerge in the context of M&A 
activity, they should perhaps cause us to reexamine the im-
pact of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in other 
areas as well. Further study in this area is therefore advisa-
ble.  
This Article does not attempt to prove that the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm is “wrong,” either positively or nor-
matively, but rather that it is overly narrow and that the costs 
it imposes on society are both significant and poorly under-
stood. Even so, it may still be the best and most workable con-
ception of corporate purpose. However, as scholars continue 
the spirited debate regarding corporate purpose, a more accu-
rate understanding of the costs and benefits of the share-
holder wealth maximization norm is essential. If these costs 
are ignored, it is to the detriment of substantial numbers of 
shareholders and consumers. 
 
